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COMMENT
RESCUING THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S
“GOLDEN MEAN”: KEEPING PARASITIC
PROFITS OUT OF THE
WHISTLEBLOWER’S POT OF GOLD
BENJAMIN R. KWAN*
INTRODUCTION
parasite ⏐
noun
An organism that lives in or on another organism (its host) and
benefits by deriving nutrients at the host’s expense.1
What follows is a prototypical exchange between attorneys who are
litigating the merits of a whistleblower’s claim that a healthcare company
has overbilled Medicare and defrauded the government. Judging by the fol-
lowing remarks, could either of the lawyers be called a parasite?
Defendant’s Attorney: The Plaintiff is a competitor who is using the
lawsuit in an attempt to gain a competitive advantage. We will vigorously
defend our client against these meritless allegations.
Plaintiff’s Attorney: My clients allege that the nation’s largest nursing
home operator and contract physical therapy company has been submitting
false Medicare and Medicaid claims for years. If my clients are successful
they would stand to share in any judgment for blowing the whistle.2
* J.D., 2013, University of St. Thomas School of Law; B.S. Journalism, Northwestern Uni-
versity. The author would like to thank the former dean of the law school, Thomas Mengler, for
his feedback and encouragement throughout the development of this Comment. The author is also
indebted to his friends, family, and to Ted Haller, whose support helped make law school a fun
and rewarding experience.
1. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011).
2. See generally Dan Browning, Whistleblower Gets Green Light to Build False-Claims
Case, STAR TRIB., Feb. 24, 2012, http://www.startribune.com/local/140316793.html. I used the
news report and the comments from opposing attorneys to synthesize the remarks representing the
defendant’s and plaintiff’s attorneys in my example.
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Whether you see a parasite at all depends. Viewed through one lens,3
the parasite might be the nursing home operator. One of the plaintiffs al-
leges the operator billed Medicare and Medicaid for therapy services that
were not provided to the nursing home’s residents.4 She alleges that her
former employer filed more than 9,000 such claims for reimbursement
while she worked at the nursing home.5 Through another lens,6 the parasite
might be the whistleblower plaintiff. She stands to share in any potential
judgment the government recovers, provided the information she came for-
ward with about her former employer proves true.7 Her share could soar
into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and perhaps many times that.8
Moreover, the whistleblower’s co-plaintiff is the defendant’s competitor,
which may seem fishily opportunistic.9
Maybe your finger points to one of these parties as the “parasite” by
way of decidedly more base factors. Are you defense-oriented or a member
of the plaintiffs’ bar? Is your agenda more pro-business or is it focused on
vindicating taxpayer rights? Do you work on an hourly-fee or contingent-
fee basis? Would you characterize the allegations as healthcare fraud and
abuse or fraud against the government? Have an opinion? Hold on to it for
just a moment.
The False Claims Act of 1863 (FCA)10 is a Civil War-era redoubtable
machine that remains as robust as ever and is the reason the question above
is even a matter for consideration. Today, the FCA enables a private indi-
vidual to sound the alarm and file suit in the name of the United States
when she knows of an undiscovered fraud against the government.11 What
is more, where the government declines to intervene, the whistleblower
may continue to pursue the fraud as a private cause of action.12 Since enact-
ing an invigorating amendment to the FCA in 1986,13 the government has
3. Cf. PETER B. HUTT II & ANNA R. DOLINSKY, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL RE-
FORM, PREVENTING GOVERNMENT OVERPAYMENTS TO QUI TAM PLAINTIFFS: PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS TO THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT (2011) (advocating for caps on rewards for persons who blow
the whistle on organizations alleged to have defrauded the government).
4. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care, LLC, Civ. No. 08-1194,
2012 WL 465676, at *1–2 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2012).
5. Id. at *2.
6. See, e.g., What We Do, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUCATION FUND, https://www.taf.
org/who-we-are/what-we-do (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (advocating the protection of the False
Claims Act against attacks by lobbyists, among others).
7. Browning, supra note 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
11. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006).
12. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3).
13. See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
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recovered more than $35 billion in misappropriated funds.14 Under the
FCA, whistleblowers are entitled to as much as thirty percent of the govern-
ment’s recovery as a reward for coming forward.15
FCA “qui tam”16 plaintiffs who become entitled to sometimes fantasti-
cal sums of money for their willingness to bring suit help frame a persistent
debate. That is, whether there is too much whistleblower largesse under the
FCA and whether the FCA has given rise to an unjust cottage industry. On
the other hand, those whistleblowers’ rewards only skim the surface of a
massive affront to the American taxpayer.17
So who exactly is the parasite? It still depends. I admit this setup poses
a bit of a trick question. And the issue of just who is the parasite (and
alternatively, who is the host) is a matter that has been—and will continue
to be—hotly debated throughout the life of the FCA.18 The key here is
maintaining equilibrium, perhaps evinced by equal amounts of finger-point-
ing on both sides of the debate. Congress moderates the balance necessary
to achieve this perception of equilibrium through provisions of the FCA that
create sufficient incentives for private parties to detect and pursue frauds on
the one hand, while discouraging whistleblower suits where the federal gov-
ernment already has the ability to discover and prosecute the fraud on its
own.19 This Comment argues that one such provision of the FCA—meant
to guard against suits filed by opportunistic qui tam plaintiffs—must be
fixed, lest the political and practical future of the FCA be eviscerated in
toto.
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the Afforda-
ble Care Act or ACA)20 amended the False Claims Act’s so-called “public
14. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics – Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, available at
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Fraud Statistics].
15. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2).
16. The shortened Latin origin of whistleblower, qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso
in hac parte sequitur, means “who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter.” A qui
tam action is one “brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a penalty, part of
which the government or some specified public institution will receive.” BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY 588 (3d Pocket ed. 2006).
17. See Health Care Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Serious Issues That Must Be Addressed
Through Concentrated and Sustained Efforts: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, Subcomm. on Health, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector
General, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services) (estimating that 7.8% of the $24.1 billion
paid out by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services in 2009 were improper payments); see
also REBECCA S. BUSCH, HEALTHCARE FRAUD: AUDITING AND DETECTION GUIDE, 2 (2008)
(describing one commentator’s estimate that about $25 million per hour is stolen in healthcare in
the United States).
18. See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of the FCA framed in terms of parasitic
profits).
19. Beverly Cohen, Kaboom! The Explosion of Qui Tam False Claims Under the Health
Reform Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 77, 78 (2011).
20. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). And as everyone knows by now, the Supreme
Court upheld the Affordable Care Act in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
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disclosure bar”21—and it did so in a way that undercuts the integrity of the
FCA. It is best to think of the public disclosure bar as a preliminary hurdle
that most qui tam plaintiffs must clear before proceeding with their suits. It
is a handy antidote to parasitic actions, which Congress first added to the
FCA in 1943 (and later fixed in 1986) after a rash of actions based on
information the government already knew.22 The jurisdictional mechanism
seeks “the golden mean between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing
insiders with genuinely valuable information and discouragement of oppor-
tunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of their
own.”23 The public disclosure bar tells a potential whistleblower that she
may not bring her suit “if substantially the same allegations or transactions
as alleged in the action or claim were [already] publicly disclosed.”24 This
limitation makes total sense. One may not blow the whistle (and avail her-
self to a substantial reward) where the whistle has already been sounded.
Generally, FCA defendants gain mandatory dismissal of a whistleblower’s
lawsuit when a court finds that there has been a public disclosure of the
whistleblower’s information.25
The ACA throws the courthouse doors wide open to a new class of qui
tam plaintiffs who have the ability to file claims where they did not
before.26 The ACA’s FCA amendment achieved this change in large part
with the addition of one word: Federal. That word now qualifies the list of
sources of information that will foreclose a qui tam suit: “Federal criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing[s] in which the Government or its agent is a
party . . . or other Federal report[s], hearing[s], audit[s], or investiga-
tion[s] . . . .” Thus, State and local reports, hearings, audits and investiga-
(2012). The implication here is that the amended public disclosure language of the False Claims
Act survives.
21. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).
22. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
23. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (emphasis added).
24. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4) (West 2012), which reads in full:
(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, unless opposed by
the Government, if substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the
action or claim were publicly disclosed—
(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the Govern-
ment or its agent is a party;
(ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other Federal re-
port, hearing, audit, or investigation; or
(iii) from the news media,
unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the
action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an individual who
either (i) prior to a public disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed
to the Government the information on which allegations or transactions in a claim are
based, or (2) who has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the pub-
licly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the infor-
mation to the Government before filing an action under this section.
25. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).
26. See infra § III for a full discussion of the likely effects of the ACA amendments.
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tions are arguably no longer off-limits. One foreseeable result of this
change is private, disinterested individuals mining obscure, yet publicly
available, state investigation results for information upon which to base a
federal FCA qui tam action.
This result, as observed by scholars27 and practitioners28 alike, is likely
to yield an expansion of FCA liability. I argue this expansion is a threat to
the FCA as a whole, which may create a backlash that imperils the future of
the FCA’s viability in the public eye. The expansion defeats the equilibrium
necessary to justify a private attorney general mechanism that properly in-
centivizes fraud detection, and simultaneously stops racketeers, shysters,
and opportunistic trolls from sussing out parasitic profits. As a result, Con-
gress ought to rethink its narrowing of the jurisdictional bar to qui tam
rights of action under the FCA. This will provide a means of tamping down
the persistent and growing myth that whistleblower private rights of action
under the FCA are a per se leech on the economy.29 In short, Congress has
veered from the “golden mean” and must re-balance the FCA.
Part I of this Comment examines the origin and evolution of the FCA
in light of the decidedly American private attorney general model of civil
litigation; Part II examines the importance of the “golden mean” and ex-
plains how the 2010 ACA amendment destroys its equilibrium; Part III
makes the case for FCA equilibrium by and through an amended public
disclosure bar (i.e., rescuing the “golden mean”); and Part IV supplies an
idea for how to make it happen, and why it must. For our purposes, the
ACA amendment presents a sort of open wound that will allow parasitic
FCA actions. That should cause Congress to reverse course, lest the foes of
the FCA finally get the case law examples, headlines, and talking points
they need to legitimize the myth that the FCA does more harm than it does
good.
I. INCENTIVIZED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION & THE FCA
A. A Threshold Question: Is the Private Attorney General Model of
Civil Litigation Still an Appropriate Means of Stopping Fraud
Against the Government?
In 1983, three years before Congress passed the substantial amend-
ments that shaped the FCA we know today, Professor John C. Coffee
asked: “to what extent can we sensibly rely on private litigation as a mecha-
27. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 19.
28. See, e.g., Robert T. Rhoad & Matthew T. Fornataro, Whistling While They Work: Limit-
ing Exposure in the Face of the PPACA’s Invitation to Employee Whistleblower Lawsuits, 22
HEALTH L. 19, 19 (2010).
29. See infra § I-C for discussion about the current public sentiments for and against the false
claims act.
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nism of law enforcement?”30 That question drives to the heart of the issue.
We can only rely on private litigation as a mechanism of law enforcement
to the extent we are sensible about it. This notion demands that a private
attorney general only be allowed to prosecute matters in the public interest
to the extent that traditional notions about laws and their utility remain in-
tact. Such values include, for example, avoiding over-deterrence and main-
taining a private attorney general statute that respects the moral hazard
problem that exists when the government can be ensured frauds will be
prosecuted even if it does not intervene.31 Notwithstanding the changes ad-
vocated here, the FCA largely avoids the problems with the private attorney
general model highlighted some three decades ago by Professor Coffee.
Private attorney general suits—at least in the FCA realm—may be de-
scribed as privatizing the enforcement of laws against corporate wrongdo-
ing.32 The private attorney general model rests on the assumption that
private litigation is not just for gaining compensation for victims, but also
serves as a means of generating deterrence.33 Private attorneys generally do
both by multiplying the resources committed to detection and prosecution.34
They are force multipliers. The Supreme Court relied on that idea when it
first decided to recognize implied private causes of action under federal
securities law.35
Private attorneys general increase the number of resources committed
to enforcing laws because private parties are better positioned to detect vio-
lations.36 To use the FCA as an example, the statute creates monetary in-
centives for private attorneys general to bring their whistle-blowing clients
forward with otherwise unascertainable (by public attorneys general, acting
without tips and inside information) details that can lead to fraud recov-
eries. Private attorneys general can also pick up a great deal of government
slack. “[C]entralized public enforcement bureaucracies frequently suffer
from ‘diseconomies of scale, given multiple layers of decision and review
and the temptation to adopt overly rigid norms in order to reduce adminis-
trative costs.’”37 Furthermore, the presence of private attorneys general can
serve as a political check on agency-counterparts, who may be inclined to
30. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer
as Bounty Hunter is not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 218 (1983).
31. See Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard Problem with Privitization of Public
Enforcement: The Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 297 (2007)
(arguing for stiffer procedural requirements and greater exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the
DOJ in FCA private attorney general suits).
32. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 184 (1997).
33. Coffee, supra note 30, at 218.
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
36. Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Ex-
panding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 108 (2005).
37. Id.
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shirk enforcement responsibilities because of political, budgetary, or even
personal pressures.38 Finally, private party litigation in the public interest is
an entrepreneurial affair. Private attorneys general tend to bring innovative
litigation and settlement techniques to the fore.39
However, those benefits can be outweighed. Harvard Law Professor
Matthew Stephenson points to three areas that give pause to any supporter
of private rights of action.40 First, when too many entrepreneurial private
attorneys general take up a cause, enforcement can become inefficient.41
Beyond wasting judicial resources, the private attorneys general may frus-
trate the goals that a public attorney general can mediate when it comes to
the economic and social impact of enforcing laws.42 Private attorneys gen-
eral can interfere with public enforcement efforts by simply getting in the
way.43 Stephenson explains that this can occur, for example, when a gov-
ernment agency may prefer to negotiate with a regulated firm in order to
establish a workable and consistent regulatory system, rather than subject
that firm to the mercy of a qui tam plaintiff on the other side of a civil
case.44 Finally, private enforcement of laws may undermine the valuable
American principle of prosecutorial discretion.45
The point of this Comment is to advocate for a necessary change to the
FCA that maintains the equilibrium it is capable of achieving—thus avoid-
ing the drawbacks Stephenson highlights. In fact, some scholars say the
FCA’s qui tam provision provides an exemplar for private rights of action
generally.46 One way the FCA provides such a good example, according to
Professor Fisch, is the close coordination between relator and government
in avoiding duplicative proceedings and ensuring consistency in litigation.47
Fisch also lauds the FCA as a means of avoiding the negative costs of the
private attorney general model by “plac[ing] a premium on the contribution
of original information”48—information the government would be unable to
obtain otherwise.49 I argue that something more akin to the old “public dis-
closure” bar is another way of making FCA qui tam suits a paradigm for
38. See id. at 109.
39. Id.; but see Matthew, supra note 31, at 320 (arguing that the nature of qui tam suits is
such that relators’ counsel often press legal theories “that often require aggressive interpretations
of existing law”—arguments that lead to settlements which lack any meaningful judicial or legis-
lative opportunity to change the law to provide prospective guidance).
40. Stephenson, supra note 36, at 115.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 117.
44. Id. (internal citation omitted).
45. Id. at 119.
46. See Fisch, supra note 32, at 183.
47. See id. at 197.
48. Id. at 196.
49. See id. (“[T]he relator can supplement the government’s litigation effort with private
resources.”).
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balanced private rights of action. This exemplar status is at risk given the
ACA 2010 Amendment.
B. The Private Attorney General Under the False Claims Act
The arc of the FCA has traversed many a zenith and nadir. The origi-
nal Act of 1863 addressed fraud against the government committed by Civil
War contractors.50 After a few sleepy generations, World War II (WWII)
gave rise to the next “feeding frenzy among unscrupulous contractors”51—
and another flurry of FCA activity (including parasitic opportunism, dis-
cussed more below). In 1986, Congress answered a call to action after the
now-infamous headlines about $7,622 ten-cup coffee makers, $435 ham-
mers, and $640 toilet seats that plagued the Reagan administration.52 It is
the 1986 Amendments to the FCA that largely provide the foundation for
what we understand the FCA to be today.
Congress reinvigorated the FCA in 1986 amidst concerns about “so-
phisticated and widespread fraud.”53 The FCA imposes a double-dose of
pain to anyone who defrauds the government.54 Not only is such a person
subject to treble damages, but she must also pay a civil penalty of not less
than $5,500 and not more than $11,000 for each false claim.55 The govern-
ment levies the treble damages and civil penalties against anyone who
knowingly presents a false claim for payment to the federal government or
improperly retains an overpayment from the federal government.56
The whistleblower, or “qui tam,” provisions of the FCA provide sub-
stantial incentives for private parties to come forward with information
about fraud committed against the government.57 These provisions also en-
able private parties to initiate an FCA action in the first instance before
government involvement.58 The FCA relator—or person relating the claim
to the government—files her claim under seal, not to be served on the de-
fendant until the court orders.59 This gives the Department of Justice a min-
imum of sixty days to decide what it wants to do with the qui tam relator’s
information—a period of time that can be extended for good reason.60 If the
50. HENRY SCAMMELL, GIANTKILLERS: THE TEAM AND THE LAW THAT HELP WHISTLE-BLOW-
ERS RECOVER AMERICA’S STOLEN BILLIONS, 39 (2004).
51. Id. at 40.
52. Id. at 43.
53. Fisch, supra note 32, at 185 (citing S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 1-2 (1986)).
54. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
55. See id.
56. See id. § 3729(a).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
60. Id. § 3730(b)(3). An internal memorandum circulated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reveals that, at least in that district, the average qui tam FCA
suit is under seal for two years. That memorandum is available at: http://www.justice.gov/usao/
pae/Documents/fcaprocess2.pdf (last accessed Nov. 13, 2013).
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government intervenes, it assumes primary responsibility for prosecuting
the claims,61 deciding whether the claims ought to be dismissed,62 and ne-
gotiating settlement.63 All the while, the qui tam plaintiff, or “relator,” re-
mains a party to the action, unless her involvement would interfere with the
government’s prosecution.64 Ultimately, the FCA’s bite lies in a relator’s
ability to maintain her private right of action if the Attorney General de-
cides not to intervene in the suit.65
Professor William Rubenstein’s description of the qui tam relator as
one of three kinds of private attorneys general is helpful in illustrating how
FCA plaintiffs fit within the broader private attorney general framework.66
Rubenstein calls the FCA whistleblower a “substitute” attorney general.67
The private attorney general in a qui tam suit is neither hired by the govern-
ment nor appointed by an executive official, “[r]ather, she is a self-ap-
pointed bounty hunter, pursuing government fraud where the government
has not done so.”68
FIGURE 1: TOTAL FCA RECOVERIES—QUI TAM AND NON-QUI TAM
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Since the 1986 amendments, two-thirds of the government’s recoveries
under the FCA have been in the area of health care fraud and abuse.69
61. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1).
62. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
63. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
64. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(C).
65. See id. § 3730(c)(3).
66. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” is—And why it Mat-
ters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2142 (2004) (describing the three types of private attorney general
as: “substitute,” “supplemental,” and “simulated”).
67. Id. at 2158.
68. Id. at 2144.
69. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics, supra note 14.
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Defense contractors are another large target.70 Since 1986, FCA
whistleblowers who filed suit and relayed information to the government
that led to settlements or judgments collected more than $3.4 billion—or
roughly ten percent of the government’s $30.3 billion in total FCA recov-
eries through the end of fiscal year 2011.71 As Figure 1 illustrates, govern-
ment fraud recoveries shot up exponentially after the 1986 Act,
commensurate with an equally astonishing number of FCA claim filings
and recoveries by whistleblowers.72
C. Flavors from the Field of FCA Litigation
Before we address the “golden mean” and the need for its rescue, it is
worth getting a flavor for the lawsuits, judgments, settlements, headlines,
and political talking points framing the ongoing debate about the FCA and
its usefulness. An interested observer will note the tension emanating from
all manner of places including the halls of Congress,73 the legal academy,
and from special interest groups.74
Media reports document whistleblower rewards—sometimes in the
millions of dollars—that can look like windfalls.75 For example, there is a
specialty pharmacy located in the Florida Keys that exists almost certainly
for the sole purpose of bringing FCA suits.76 Acting as an FCA
whistleblowing plaintiff, the pharmacy has raked in millions. It is called
Ven-A-Care of the Florida Keys, Inc. and is made up primarily of lawyers.
The pharmacy claimed that Mylan Inc., a generic drug company, defrauded
the United States and several states by falsely reporting inflated drug prices.
Ven-A-Care brought suit on behalf of the United States under the
whistleblower provisions of the FCA.77 The case settled after a consolida-
tion of claims against many other defendants in multidistrict litigation.78
Ven-A-Care collected $8.5 million in connection with its allegations against
Mylan alone.79 Since 2000, the specialty pharmacy based in a tiny head-
70. See id. (reporting nearly $4.9 billion in Department of Defense agency-related settlement
and judgments from 1987 to 2011).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See, e.g., Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 155 Cong. Rec. S4604-04,
S4610 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 2009) available at 2009 WL 1098184, *16.
74. Compare, e.g., What We Do, supra note 6 (advocating for a robust FCA and strong
provisions for whistleblowers), with, e.g., HUTT & DOLINSKY, supra note 3 (advocating for a
tightened FCA with proposed measures like caps on relators’ rewards).
75. See, e.g., David Voreacos, Mylan to Pay $57 Million to Settle Drug Overpricing Claims,
BLOOMBERG, Feb. 28, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-28/mylan-to-pay-57-mil-
lion-to-settle-drug-overpricing-claims-1-.html (reporting an $8.5 million dollar whistleblower
share).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. See In re Pharm. Industry Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D. Mass.
2007).
79. Voreacos, supra note 75.
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quarters located down a nondescript alleyway in Key West, Florida80 has
settled more than two-dozen FCA lawsuits that allowed state and federal
governments to collect more than $3 billion.81 By some accounts, Ven-A-
Care’s total reward-share was more than $400 million.82
Ven-A-Care’s cottage industry only tells a sliver of the story. Many
other whistleblowers have come forward on an individual basis with insider
information. On December 29, 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) an-
nounced a $30 million settlement with GE Healthcare Inc.83 In that case,
the whistleblower alleged that a company GE Healthcare acquired in 2004,
Amersham Health Inc., had violated the FCA by causing Medicare to over-
pay for a drug used in certain cardiac diagnostic imaging procedures.84 In-
terestingly, the whistleblower was a pharmaceutical representative who sold
competitor Bristol-Myers Squibb’s similar drug.85 GE Healthcare paid the
relator $5.1 million out of the total settlement.86
In March 2012, the DOJ announced a settlement and reward for two
whistleblowers who were more traditional—insiders employed by the de-
fendant company.87 In that case, the whistleblowers alleged both kickbacks
and fraudulent claims.88 As is typical in many FCA cases, the fraud oc-
curred when LifeWatch Services, Inc., a Rosemont, Illinois company, billed
Medicare for technologically advanced services for which patients did not
qualify.89 The difference in price between the service for which LifeWatch
billed and the appropriate, less-advanced service was nearly $1,000 per
claim.90 The whistleblowers’ complaints alleged that LifeWatch nonethe-
less submitted claims to Medicare using a false diagnostic code in order to
have the claims paid.91 In this case, the whistleblowers’ share of an $18.5
million settlement was $3.4 million plus interest.92
80. Eamon Javers, Ven-a-Care: Whistleblowing for Dollars, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2011, 7:30
AM), http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=1790801149.
81. Voreacos, supra note 75.
82. Id.
83. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, GE Healthcare Inc. Pays
U.S. $30 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-civ-1717.html.
84. Id.
85. Chad Halcom, Local Whistle-Blower Suit Ends up Costing GE $30 Million, CRAIN’S
DETROIT BUSINESS, Dec. 29, 2011, http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20111229/FREE/111229
919/local-whistle-blower-suit-ends-up-costing-ge-30-million#.
86. Press Release, supra note 83.
87. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, United States Settles
False Claims Act Allegations Against Illinois-Based Lifewatch Services (Mar. 23, 2012), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/March/12-civ-369.html.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Tension over the usefulness of the FCA resonates in Congress from
time to time. In 2009, Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona proposed an FCA amend-
ment that would have capped the rewards paid to whistleblowers.93 Senator
Kyl’s proposed amendments failed in quick succession. The various ver-
sions would have capped a relator’s share under the qui tam provisions of
the FCA anywhere between $5 and $50 million, or, alternatively, 300 per-
cent of the expenses that a relator incurs in prosecuting the action.94
During the debate, Senator Kyl argued that whistleblower rewards
“come at the expense of the Treasury” and that excessive rewards “are de-
nying the taxpayers the benefit of the False Claims Act which was, of
course, intended to benefit the Treasury and not to significantly benefit
these private relators.”95 Senator Kyl, an Arizona Republican, claimed that
the drafters of the 1986 Amendments never could have contemplated the
billion-dollar-plus recoveries that exist today and that the relator’s share of
such recoveries would never have been allowed.96 Senator Charles
Grassley, a fellow Republican, (and co-sponsor of the 1986 Amendments)
took up the other side of the political rhetoric.97 Grassley pointed to the
average award a relator claimed in certain instances over the years. As of
2009, in “cases where the DOJ joins the whistleblower, the average share
for the whistleblower is not 25 percent or 30 percent, it is 16 percent.”98
Grassley added that, viewed as a “cost,” that average was not out of line
when compared to the average administrative costs of Government.99 He
concluded with a pointed barb:
It is about recovering money, taxpayers’ money. I find it ironic-I
hope people are listening now because there is a conflict here
between maybe people on my side of the aisle who think this is a
good idea-I find it very ironic that those outside groups support-
ing this amendment were in staunch opposition to the idea of the
Senate imposing any caps on executive compensation at compa-
nies receiving bailout funds. Now instead, they want to cap the
recovery of good-faith whistleblowers to come forward with
claims of fraud at companies that are ripping off American
taxpayers.100
The interest groups help narrate the political debate that plays out in
Congress and elsewhere. On the one side, for example, you will find the
U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform. The Chamber Institute is con-
93. See Proposed Amendments 986, 987, 988, and 989 to S. 386, 155 CONG. REC. S4588-02,
S4589 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
94. See id.
95. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, supra note 73, at *16.
96. See id. at *15.
97. See id. at *25–26.
98. Id. at *25.
99. Id. at *25.
100. Id. at *26.
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stantly trying to pare down the FCA, with special attention fixed fairly con-
stantly on qui tam plaintiffs.101 On the other side of the discussion is an
organization called Taxpayers Against Fraud. Its avowed purpose is de-
scribed as follows: “Our work is necessary because the False Claims Act
works so well that unscrupulous special interests are always plotting new
ways to weaken the law.”102
So now you see the ebb and flow, the push and pull, the tug and slack
that surrounds the FCA and the myriad questions about its success, its use-
fulness, and its future. It is finally the perfect time to discuss the “golden
mean” and the 2010 amendments to the FCA that truly are a threat to main-
taining the balance necessary to preserve the FCA as “the single most im-
portant tool U.S. taxpayers have to recover the billions of dollars stolen
through fraud by U.S. government contractors every year.”103
II. THE “GOLDEN MEAN”
A. Mediating the Tension
The term “golden mean” finds its textual origin in United States ex rel.
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, a 1994 Court of Appeals opinion.104
But its spirit is something Congress has striven for since 1863. Judge Wald
on the D.C. Circuit penned the phrase, describing “the golden mean be-
tween adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely val-
uable information and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have
no significant information to contribute of their own.”105 As the court in
Springfield notes, “Congress has frequently altered its course in drafting
and amending the qui tam provisions since initial passage of the FCA over a
century ago.”106 One means of preventing parasitic qui tam suits was the
public disclosure bar. Congress has veered from the golden mean with the
2010 ACA amendment to the public disclosure bar and must now return to
provide the balance necessary to maintain a private right of action as pow-
erful as the FCA.
1. The Evolution of the Public Disclosure Bar
The original False Claims Act of 1863 provided no means by which
the courts could bar an opportunistic plaintiff from filing a qui tam suit
101. See, e.g., HUTT & DOLINSKY, supra note 3 (advocating, among many things, for the kind
of reward caps pitched by Sen. Kyl, mandatory internal reporting through corporate compliance
programs, and foreclosure of qui tam actions when the defendant has already disclosed its alleged
wrongdoing).
102. What We Do, supra note 6.
103. Id.
104. See United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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based on evidence or information the government already had.107 To
achieve a “golden mean” between proper incentives and improper opportu-
nism, the original Act required qui tam plaintiffs to bear the full cost of
their litigation efforts.108 This “invitation for abuse”109 would not be taken
up, however, for decades.
Like the impetus for the original Act of 1863, wartime again ushered
in the FCA’s next major season. As government contracts boomed during
WWII and during the decade following the New Deal, so did the number of
qui tam suits alleging impropriety.110 But without a means of barring
whistleblower suits based on information the government already pos-
sessed, the field was ripe for opportunistic plaintiffs to file “parasitic” law-
suits.111 Just as WWII gave rise to a “feeding frenzy among unscrupulous
contractors” to defraud the government, the era also served as a heyday for
opportunistic attorneys who piggy-backed on publicized government accu-
sations and filed parasitic qui tam suits.112
The era of parasitic qui tam actions reached its apex in 1943 when the
Supreme Court decided United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess.113 In Marcus,
the Supreme Court allowed a qui tam relator to proceed with an FCA
whistleblower suit using a complaint that almost certainly copied
paragraphs verbatim from a publicly available criminal indictment to which
the defendants had already pled no contest.114 The Court held that this kind
of opportunism could not be blocked because neither the FCA nor the legis-
lative history barred such a suit.115 So, even though the relator contributed
no additional information to aid the government in a civil suit to recover
taxpayer funds under the FCA, he was still able to share in the govern-
ment’s ultimate recovery.116
Congress responded swiftly, amid vociferous public outcry. President
Roosevelt signed the 1943 Amendments to the FCA on December 21, en-
acting the first iteration of the public disclosure bar, which was based on
government knowledge.117 The statute reflected an ultimate compromise
between the House and Senate.118 The House bill would have killed
107. Id. at 649–50.
108. Id. at 649.
109. Id. (citing United States ex rel. LaValley v. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 707 F. Supp. 1351,
1354 (D. Mass. 1988)).
110. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
111. See United States ex rel. S. Prawer & Co. v. Fleet Bank of Maine, 24 F.3d 320, 324 (1st
Cir. 1994).
112. SCAMMELL, supra note 50, at 40–41.
113. S. Prawer & Co., 24 F.3d at 324–25.
114. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 558 (1943) (J. Jackson, dissenting).
115. See id. at 546–47.
116. See id. at 545.
117. See S. Prawer & Co., 24 F.3d at 325.
118. Id.
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whistleblower actions altogether; the Senate bill would have precluded suits
that were based upon information already in the government’s possession
unless the whistleblower was an “original source” of the information.119
The Senate’s version largely won out, but with a deletion of the “original
source” provision.120 The final version of the first public disclosure bar pre-
cluded all qui tam actions “based on evidence or information the Govern-
ment had when the action was brought.”121 It also reduced the
whistleblower’s potential reward from half to no more than ten percent
where the government intervened in the action.122 The result was forty
years with very few qui tam actions because “courts strictly construed the
jurisdictional bar.”123 The 1943 amendment contained no protection for
“original source” whistleblowers who furnished evidence or information to
the government in the first place.124
If the era pre-dating the 1943 amendment is best characterized by ram-
pant opportunism (of which, Marcus was just one of many cases125) that
frustrated the goals of the FCA, the wake of the 1943 amendment gave way
to an era of FCA stagnation. In other words, neither period achieved any
sort of “golden mean” of FCA fraud recovery. Between 1943 and 1986,
whistleblowers only brought about 100 qui tam actions, most of which
failed.126 The 1986 amendment changed that.
In fact, it took $640 toilet seats127 (that ought to have been plated with
gold leaf, given the price!) to reach the “golden mean” Congress appears to
have been striving for all along. After titillating media reports of govern-
ment overspending induced by federal contractors, Congress took up the
reins of the FCA once again and reinvigorated the statute’s qui tam provi-
sions—this time with arguably more adequate incentives and protections.
The 1986 amendment repealed the “government knowledge” jurisdictional
bar and replaced it with a provision that restricted the subject matter juris-
diction of private plaintiff suits:
Based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in
a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, ad-
ministrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing,
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (superseded)).
122. SCAMMELL, supra note 50, at 42.
123. S. Prawer & Co., 24 F.3d at 325. See also United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729
F.2d 1100, 1104–06 (7th Cir. 1984) (barring a qui tam suit brought by the State of Wisconsin
because the federal government already possessed the information upon which Wisconsin based
its whistleblower suit because Wisconsin had been required by law to report fraud it had uncov-
ered before filing its complaint).
124. United States ex rel. D.J. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 680
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
125. Id.
126. SCAMMELL, supra note 50, at 42.
127. See id. at 43.
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audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action
is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the
action is an original source of the information.128
An “original source” was “an individual who has direct and independent
knowledge of the information . . . [who] . . . voluntarily provided the infor-
mation to the Government before filing an action . . . .”129 Congress in-
tended for the original source rule to make certain that a whistleblower who
filed suit after a public disclosure of a fraud had helpful firsthand knowl-
edge that would assist in prosecution (direct knowledge) and that the
whistleblower had discovered this information on her own (independent of
the public disclosure).130
2. The Life of the Public Disclosure Bar pre-ACA
The results of the 1986 amendments to the FCA (spurred both by the
relaxed jurisdictional bar as well as enhanced whistleblower rewards and
the right to maintain a private right of action absent government interven-
tion) is illustrated best by the following chart:
FIGURE 2: NEW ANNUAL FCA FILINGS—COMPARING NUMBER OF QUI
TAM AND NON-QUI TAM FILINGS
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During the first year after the 1986 amendment, thirty relators filed
FCA suits. Just ten years later, 547 relators filed suit in federal court, and in
2011, that number reached an all-time high of 638 new qui tam filings.131
128. D.J. Findley, 105 F.3d at 681 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1994) (superseded)).
129. Id.
130. Cohen, supra note 19, at 88.
131. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics, supra note 14.
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As Figure 2132 illustrates, new FCA claims brought by whistleblowers
make up an increasingly greater proportion of the total number of new FCA
filings each year.
In the courts, defendants used the public disclosure bar as a first line of
defense, typically motioning first on the question of whether public disclo-
sure had occurred, and second, on whether the relator was an original
source.133 While the 1986 amendment was the closest Congress had ever
come to a “golden mean” between the poles of pre-1943 parasitic lawsuits
and post-1943 FCA stagnation, the amendment also unearthed a new round
of challenges. As Professor Beverly Cohen notes, courts provided inconsis-
tent answers to questions about what constituted public disclosure and who
was an original source.134
Although the language of the statute does not make clear exactly
which cases Congress intended to bar, the circuits generally agreed on the
basic inquiry required by the public disclosure bar.135 First, one must ask:
Have allegations made by the relator been “publicly disclosed” before the
relator brought her qui tam action?136 Second: If the allegations have been
publicly disclosed, was the qui tam suit “based upon” the public disclo-
sure?137 And third: If so, was the relator an “original source” of the infor-
mation on which the allegations were based?138 Jurisdiction only existed if
the answer to one of the first two questions was “no,” or the answer to the
third question was “yes.”139
By the time the 2010 ACA amendment was passed, it may have been a
ripe time for some kind of change. For example, better codifying what con-
stitutes a public disclosure or who an original source is. But not the change
ushered in by Congress, which will likely result in a new era of parasitic
FCA litigation.
B. The “Golden Mean” Under Fire
With the ACA amendment to the FCA, Congress cast aside any sem-
blance of a “golden mean” it had struggled for more than 100 years to
attain. Professor Cohen predicts the change to the public disclosure bar will
result in an explosion of qui tam false claims.140 This anticipated surge of
whistleblower suits under the FCA threatens a new era of parasitic litigation
that could create a backlash strong enough to undo the FCA.
132. Id.
133. Cohen, supra note 19, at 88.
134. See id.
135. United States ex rel. Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2003).
136. Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1042
(8th Cir. 2002) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (1986) (superseded)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See generally Cohen, supra note 19.
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The ACA fundamentally changed the FCA by eliminating two statu-
tory limitations to qui tam jurisdiction.141 First, the “public disclosure” pro-
vision now enumerates a smaller pool of public disclosures that will block a
whistleblower’s suit.142 Second, the ACA revised the “original source” rule
to eliminate the “direct knowledge” requirement, which Cohen says used to
be the “most stringent requirement that relators needed to satisfy to main-
tain their suits.”143 Cohen argues that these changes have enormously
broadened the ability of relators to commence qui tam lawsuits.144 Indeed, a
plain reading of the statute as amended suggests just that.
The first change is subtle, and therefore, probably best understood by
seeing the “before and after” side-by-side. The original public disclosure
bar, as codified after the 1986 amendment, read:
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this
section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transac-
tions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congres-
sional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless
the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bring-
ing the action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, ‘original source’ means an
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the in-
formation on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily
provided the information to the Government before filing an ac-
tion under this section which is based on the information.145
Compare that with the new language, post-ACA. Notice the subtle dif-
ferences, some of which are italicized in bold:
(4)(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this sec-
tion, unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same
allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were
publicly disclosed—
(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in
which the Government or its agent is a party;
(ii) in a congressional, Government [sic] Accountability Of-
fice, or other Federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation;
or
(iii) from the news media,
unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information.
141. Id. at 77.
142. Id. at 77–78.
143. Id. at 78.
144. Id.
145. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (2006), amended by 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B)
(Supp. IV 2010).
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(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an
individual who either (i) prior to a public disclosure under subsec-
tion (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the in-
formation on which allegations or transactions in a claim are
based, or (2) who has KNOWLEDGE that is independent of and MA-
TERIALLY ADDS TO the publicly disclosed allegations or transac-
tions, and who has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing an action under this section.146
First, by adding the word “Federal” in clauses (i) and (ii) of subpara-
graph (A), the ACA simultaneously narrowed the scope of the public dis-
closure bar and broadened the scope of potential sources of information
upon which a whistleblower could base her FCA suit. If one views the pub-
lic disclosure bar as a hurdle qui tam plaintiffs must clear before proceed-
ing, the ACA lowered that hurdle. A qui tam plaintiff can now conceivably
clear it with State and local criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings
under a plain reading of the amended statute. Second, State and local re-
ports, hearings, audits and investigations no longer qualify as public disclo-
sures that will bar a suit because the word “Federal” now modifies that list
too. Third, the class of Federal civil, criminal, and administrative hearings
that will be considered a public disclosure barring a qui tam suit are now
limited to those in which the government or a government agent is a
party.147
President Barack Obama signed the ACA into law on March 23, 2010,
ultimately effecting these changes and, arguably destroying the “golden
mean.” Just seven days later, the previously open question about whether
state and local sources of information could buttress an FCA qui tam suit
would have been decided by the Supreme Court. On March 30, 2010, the
Supreme Court released its 7-2 opinion on the matter in Graham County
Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson.148 In Gra-
ham County, the Court held that the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions contained in State and local “administrative” sources (reports,
audits, and investigations) would bar qui tam actions—just as their federal
counterparts would.149 The Court’s holding applies only to FCA suits filed
before March 23, 2010.
146. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (West 2012) (as amended).
147. See United States ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academi Training Center, Inc., No. 1:11CV371,
slip op. at *13 n. 36 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2013) (an example of emerging jurisprudential commen-
tary post-ACA amendments suggesting that federal suits brought by one private party against
another could be the source of a qui tam action in that it would not trigger the public disclosure
bar under the 2010 FCA amendments).
148. 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2010) reh’g denied, 130 S. Ct. 3351 (2010).
149. Id.
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A second major change to the public disclosure bar is the deletion of
the “direct knowledge” requirement from the “original source” rule.150 To
reiterate, the “original source” rule provides an escape hatch for relators
whose qui tam suits are based upon information already publicly disclosed.
It allows such a relator to proceed with her action because she was the
“original source” of the information. Before the ACA, most courts inter-
preted “direct knowledge” narrowly, holding that a relator seeking to prove
“direct knowledge” had to prove she did not learn of the fraud from an
intermediate source.151 This meant the escape hatch was effectively limited
to “only those who had either participated in the fraud or observed it first-
hand.”152 As Professor Cohen sees it, a relator may now learn of a fraud
through a public disclosure, seek out independent knowledge from an inter-
mediate, undisclosed source, and then take that information to the court-
house as the basis for a qui tam suit, so long as her independent knowledge
“materially adds” to the public disclosure.153 As Professor Cohen writes:
“Kaboom!”154 Here come the parasitic profits in the whistleblower’s pot of
gold.
III. RESCUING THE “GOLDEN MEAN”
Why not begin with the pushback? Perhaps the “golden mean” does
not need rescuing. Professor Cohen points out that the ACA amendments to
the FCA came at a time when Congress “sought to increase incentives to
private citizens to detect and report health care fraud that the federal gov-
ernment otherwise would be unlikely to discover.”155 And if we accept this
view, that will certainly happen. Congress’s intent appears to be a deliberate
move calculated to increase whistleblower litigation.156 But easing the path
to a qui tam suit under the FCA is not the proper incentive to increase the
number of private citizens who detect and report health care fraud (which
is, admittedly, a legitimate goal). By emasculating the public disclosure bar,
the ACA disrupts the “golden mean.” Soon, we can expect to see parasitic
suits surfacing just as they did before the 1943 amendment that gutted the
FCA of its usefulness for more than four decades.157
A backlash aimed at the parasitic profits may follow as whistleblower
suits based upon publicly-disclosed but non-Federal information result in
150. For a lengthier discussion of this change to the public disclosure bar following the ACA,
see Christopher M. Alexion, Note, Open the Door, Not the Floodgates: Controlling Qui Tam
Litigation Under the False Claims Act, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 365 (2012).
151. Cohen, supra note 19, at 92.
152. Id. at 93 n. 105 (collecting cases standing for the proposition).
153. See id. at 95–96.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 89.
156. See id. at 89 n. 83.
157. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (“[t]he past serves as a prologue”).
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whistleblower windfalls that induce public ire. If the possibility of a back-
lash seems like a hypothesis founded on improper assumptions, one only
needs to look at current sentiments about whistleblowers like Ven-A-Care,
the four-man professional whistleblowing outfit discussed above. Take, for
instance, a recent CNBC video segment profiling Ven-A-Care as part of a
larger series on “bounty hunters.”158 During CNBC reporter Eamon
Javers’s story, he framed the report as a profile about a group of profes-
sional whistleblowers who targeted the pharmaceutical industry, “costing
that industry over a billion dollars in settlements and making hundreds of
millions of dollars themselves.”159 Javers concluded his profile by drawing
a parallel to new securities whistleblower provisions under Section 21F of
the Exchange Act added by Dodd-Frank.160 Javers described the sentiment
on Wall Street as fearful of whistleblowers in the securities realm if they are
to resemble anything like Ven-A-Care.161 According to the business re-
porter, a Ven-A-Care on Wall Street plays out like this: “A tiny player finds
some kind of industry standard practice and makes the case that it is actu-
ally fraud and goes on a lawsuit rampage, really winning victory after vic-
tory the way Ven-A-Care did.”162
A. The Parasitic Suits Will Follow
There should be no doubt that parasitic suits will surface; the doors are
open, opportunistic plaintiffs will come. Because qui tam plaintiffs file their
complaints under a sixty-day seal,163 which may be extended for good
cause seemingly indefinitely,164 this litigation flood will appear like a desert
wash: dry one second, raging with water the next. Courts deciding defen-
dant motions to dismiss based on Section 3730(e)(4)’s public disclosure bar
are currently foretelling this result. Courts are consistently deciding “public
disclosure” motions using the Graham County holding (barring qui tam
suits whether the publicly disclosed information was federal or state) for
whistleblower actions filed prior to the ACA’s enactment on March 23,
2010.165 The courts agree that the ACA’s amendments to the public disclo-
158. Javers, supra note 80.
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
164. See id. § 3730(b)(3).
165. See, e.g., United States v. ITT Educ. Services, Inc., 1:07-CV-0867-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL
1028794 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2012) (Signed into law by President Obama on March 23, 2010, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119, amended the lan-
guage of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), but Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 176 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2010) concluded that the
change is not retroactive. See 130 S. Ct. at 1400 n. 1. Thus, the prior version of the statute applies
to the present dispute.).
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sure bar and original source rules were not made retroactive.166 But some of
these decisions foreshadow the kinds of whistleblower litigation that will be
permitted as soon as cases filed after March 23, 2010 come out from under
seal, and plaintiffs begin to clear the new, lower public disclosure hurdle.
In United States ex rel. Estate of Cunningham v. Millennium Laborato-
ries of California, the District of Massachusetts held that allegations of
FCA violations already publicly disclosed in a California state defamation
suit barred a qui tam action.167 The court applied the pre-ACA public dis-
closure bar as it existed at the time Robert Cunningham, the qui tam relator,
filed his first complaint in December 2009.168 But the result would have
been different had Cunningham waited just three months to file his qui tam
action, after the ACA amendments. The court conceded that, “[t]he current
version of the public disclosure bar clearly limits suits in state court from
qualifying as a prior public disclosure.”169 Under the current, amended FCA
language, a California state suit would not qualify as a prior, public disclo-
sure.170 The facts of Millennium give a flavor for the potential opportunism
the ACA has unleashed.
The key to seeing the new, ample source of opportunism the ACA
amendment creates is noting the timing of the filing of the Millennium suit
and the circumstances leading up to it. Whistleblower Robert Cunningham
worked for a Millennium Labs competitor, Calloway Laboratories, Inc.171
Both companies provided services to physicians—i.e., Millennium provided
urine drug testing.172 Cunningham worked as a Calloway compliance of-
ficer, so he had some familiarity with the Medicare billing practices that
Millennium would be accused of using to defraud the government.173
Cunningham (who later died and whose estate stepped into his shoes
as relator) filed his qui tam action five days after Millennium had initiated
its own lawsuit against Calloway in California state court.174 Millennium
sued Calloway for defamation after a series of emails between Calloway
representatives and Millennium customers. To simplify, it appears the Cal-
loway representatives were accusing Millennium of “practices that could
lead to ‘potential legal exposure’” for Millennium’s physician-custom-
166. See id.
167. United States ex rel. Estate of Cunningham v. Millennium Labs. of Cal., 841 F. Supp. 2d
523, 529 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d in relevant part 713 F.3d 662, 672 (1st Cir. 2013).
168. Id. at 528.
169. Id. at 527 (emphasis added).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 525.
172. Id. at 526.
173. See U.S. ex rel. Estate of Cunningham v. Millennium Labs. of Cal., 841 F. Supp. 2d 523,
525–26 (D. Mass. 2012).
174. Id. at 526.
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ers.175 Millennium got ahold of these e-mails and included them in the defa-
mation suit it filed in California state court.176
In those emails and in its complaint, Millennium described its billing
practice plainly, and argued that Calloway had misrepresented Millennium
as fraudulent.177 In doing so, Millennium also publicly disclosed all of the
facts upon which Cunningham relied for his whistleblower suit five days
later.178 The court reasoned that Millennium did not likely file its state defa-
mation suit to shield itself from whistleblower-initiated FCA liability, be-
cause ultimately, Millennium was not “insulating itself from potential
liability in a lawsuit brought by the United States government.”179
The court’s reasoning in Millenium is exactly why the public disclo-
sure bar worked so much better. It barred opportunistic qui tam suits based
on information already available in a public forum. As the court in Millen-
nium observed, “[i]n such a case, a relator is not necessary to ‘root out [the]
fraud . . . .’”180 But now, in such a case (as the Millennium court conceded)
a relator—either Cunningham (with somewhat close knowledge) or a disin-
terested third party—could conceivably bring that very same suit and clear
the public disclosure bar by trolling state court dockets alone.
B. The Parasitic Suits that Follow Will Frustrate the “Golden Mean”
that Several Congresses and Countless Courts Have Striven To
Achieve
In the simplest sense, the ACA amendments frustrate the “golden
mean” by making the public disclosure subsection of the FCA’s
whistleblower provisions inconsistent with the rest of Section 3730. The
best way to understand this is to ask what Congress intended in 1986, ana-
lyze how the pre-ACA Section 3730 was structured, and determine how the
provisions operated together.
The 1986 legislation sought not only to provide the government’s law
enforcers with more effective tools, but also to encourage any individual
with knowledge of a fraud against the government to bring that information
forward.181 In the face of sophisticated and widespread fraud, Congress be-
lieved “only a coordinated effort of both the Government and the citizenry
[would] decrease this wave of defrauding public funds.”182 But with the
175. See id. at 526.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 531 (“There is no doubt that the allegations made in the first count of the
original Complaint are substantially similar to the information disclosed in the California suit
complaint.”).
179. United States ex rel. Estate of Cunningham v. Millennium Labs. of Cal., 841 F. Supp. 2d
523, 530 (D. Mass. 2012).
180. Id. at 530.
181. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–67.
182. Id.
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“past as prologue,” Congress knew they must strike a balance in order to
avoid unleashing parasitic claims.
Both the 1943 and the 1986 amendments focused on enhancing the
statute’s power by making sure that qui tam relators provide useful informa-
tion.183 The 1986 amendment’s reinvigoration was “intended as, and has
been applied as, an informer statute—a means to gain information about
legal transgressions that might not otherwise be known.”184 Scholars high-
light the historical significance of parsing Congress’s intent in this manner.
“The history of informer statutes from England to America and down to
Marcus was based on the qui tam relator relaying information, not repeating
information already possessed. If that were the case, qui tam actions would
not be ‘informer’ statutes, but ‘repeater’ statutes.”185
Section 3730, outlined in pertinent part, looks for and stands for the
following, as understood through the 1986 amendment’s legislative
history:186
Subsection (a) – Attorney General may bring FCA claims
Subsection (b) – Private persons may bring FCA claims
Subsection (c) – Provides an active role for private AGs
Subsection (d) – Provides monetary incentive for private AGs
Subsection (e) – Limits who can bring suit, sources of proof187
The inclusion of subsection (e) speaks to two things: who Congress
anticipated would serve as a whistleblower and what facts those relators
could fairly use as the basis for a qui tam suit.188 In other words, subsection
(e) sought to make sure that useful information was gleaned from qui tam
actions and that the information did not come from a parasitic source.189
Read together, the legislative history and the statute suggest that Con-
gress was striving for a “golden mean” by creating an informer’s statute,
not a bounty hunter—or repeater—statute. In United States ex rel. Findley
v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, the D.C. Circuit noted that:
After ricocheting between the extreme permissiveness that pre-
ceded the 1943 amendments and the extreme restrictiveness that
followed, Congress again sought to achieve the golden mean be-
tween adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with gen-
uinely valuable information and discouragement of opportunistic
183. A.G. Harmon, Bounty Hunters and Whistleblowers: Constitutional Concerns for False
Claims Actions After Passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 2 AM.
U. LAB. & EMP. L.F. 1, 9 (2011). Harmon goes on to question the constitutionality of the ACA
amendments to the public disclosure bar based on Article III standing, the Article II Appointments
Clause, and the Article II “Take Care” clause. Id. at 10.
184. Id. at 9.
185. Id.
186. See S. REP., supra note 181, at 5288–93 (discussing the intent of Section 3730).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Harmon, supra note 183, at 9.
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plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute on
their own.190
Some commentators read the statute and its legislative history and ar-
gue that what Congress intended in 1986 was a “resourceful relator” statute
that would clear the way for disinterested third parties to bring qui tam
suits.191 The ACA amendment fundamentally changed the FCA—not only
making it more of a “resourceful relator” statute, but ultimately transform-
ing the FCA into a “repeater’s statute.” Supporters of a lower public disclo-
sure bar celebrate the broader pool of civil and criminal suits, government
audits, reports, hearings, and investigations from which a qui tam suit might
be culled.192 I fear that this celebration will be met with enough frustra-
tion—after an onslaught of parasitic actions—that renewed attempts to
achieve a “golden mean” will be scrapped. Instead of trying to fix this new
problem, opponents of the FCA may finally get their way and use the para-
sitic actions as a basis for gutting the whistleblower provisions of the FCA
entirely. That would mean the loss of a federal tool that, since 1986, has
proved valuable as a means of recovering taxpayer dollars. In other words,
there is a “golden mean,” and it’s worth fighting for.
The trouble with trying to rely on nearly 150 years of legislative his-
tory to pinpoint the exact balance the “golden mean” ought to achieve, how-
ever, is that there is some 150 years worth of point and counterpoint. The
Third Circuit accurately summarized this problem, stating:
The bill that eventuated in the 1986 amendments underwent sub-
stantial revisions during its legislative path. This provides ample
opportunity to search the legislative history and find some support
somewhere for almost any construction of the many ambiguous
terms in the final version.193
Thus, as other commentators have recognized,194 focusing on social
concerns and public policy—instead of relying solely on legislative in-
tent—will be beneficial in illustrating that the “golden mean” does indeed
need rescuing.
190. 105 F.3d 675, 680 (1st Cir. 1997).
191. See, e.g., Chris S. Stewart, Note, Resourceful Relators: The Rise of Qui Tam Suits Under
the False Claims Act Based on Information Obtained in Civil Litigation, 89 TEX. L. REV. 169, 169
(2010).
192. See id. at 177.
193. See United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir.
1991).
194. See, e.g., Alexion, supra note 150, at 403–06 (providing an in-depth analysis of one of
the other ACA amendments to the public disclosure bar, the “original source” alterations).
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C. The Post-ACA Public Disclosure Bar is Drafted in Such a Way that
It Creates Conflicting—Even Contradictory—Sources of
Possible “Public Disclosures”
The ACA amendment to the FCA’s public disclosure bar creates a
puzzling inconsistency in the statute itself. On the one hand, it suggests the
bar is meant to have a broad scope by listing “news media” (without qualifi-
cation) as sources of public disclosures.195 On the other hand, however, the
statute suggests a narrow bar, with the ACA’s addition of the word “Fed-
eral” to qualify this list of enumerated sources of public disclosures: Federal
criminal, civil, or administrative hearings; and Federal reports, hearings, au-
dits, or investigations.196 I argue that Congress ought not to have written a
statute that purports to have both a broad and narrow public disclosure bar.
Such a statutory construction will result in parasitic actions that will leave
too much room for a drastic over-correction.
The current iteration of the post-ACA public disclosure bar suggests
that a whistleblower suit based upon allegations or transactions disclosed in
a news media report will be barred, period. But a whistleblower suit based
on allegations or transactions disclosed in a State court civil suit would not
be barred. This yields incredibly inconsistent results, especially if we agree
with the Supreme Court’s repeated conclusion that the “statutory touch-
stone” of the public disclosure bar continues to be “whether the allegations
of fraud have been ‘public[ly] disclos[ed],’ § 3730(e)(4)(A), not whether
they have landed on the desk of a DOJ lawyer.”197
A simple hypothetical might illustrate the point a little better. Say an
investigative reporter in a small or medium-sized city with no U.S. Attor-
ney’s office reports on a story that reveals some element of wrongdoing at a
nursing home. It is not out of the question that the fruit of the reporter’s
journalism yields enough information upon which anyone, including an in-
sider at the nursing home or a disinterested third-party, could plead with
particularity the allegations or transactions sufficient to make an FCA claim
in federal court. Under the pre- and post-ACA public disclosure bar, that
suit would be dismissed (unless the whistleblower is an original source of
the information who either “voluntarily disclosed to the Government the
information on which allegations or transactions in a claim are based”
before the public disclosure or is a person with “knowledge that is indepen-
dent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transac-
tions . . . ”).198
195. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii).
196. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(i)–(ii).
197. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel Wilson, 559 U.S.
280, 300 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
198. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B).
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Now imagine a similar scenario where the facts upon which a
whistleblower suit could be pleaded are included (perhaps incidentally) as
attachments to a complaint filed in State court for, say, elder abuse or some
other claim that might involve Medicare billings. An opportunistic plaintiff
in some large cities could literally walk that complaint down the street from
State to Federal court. Once there, she could use it as the basis for a FCA
whistleblower suit that would pass the new public disclosure bar. Assuming
the opportunistic plaintiff had enough facts from the State complaint to
plead with particularity, the door to discovery would be open, and the re-
sulting paper trail could lead to a windfall for the parasitic whistleblower.
The inconsistency of these two hypothetical outcomes is troublesome.
How much sense does it make to bar FCA suits based on disclosures in all
news media reports, but to bar only FCA suits based on disclosures in Fed-
eral courts, investigations, audits, etc.? Section 3730(e)(4) is not about what
is or is not already at the DOJ’s fingertips, but rather who should be allowed
to put information of value in the DOJ’s hands as a whistleblower. Despite
the recent changes to the law, the Supreme Court continues to recognize
this distinction.
In Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District v. United
States ex rel. Kirk, the Supreme Court held that Section 3730(e)’s reference
to “administrative” reports, audits, and investigations encompassed disclo-
sures made in state and local sources as well as federal sources.199 As dis-
cussed above, the Court’s holding in Graham County now applies only to
suits filed before the ACA amendments to the public disclosure bar.200 But
the court’s discussion of the breadth and purpose of the bar is still relevant,
especially where nothing about the broad inclusion of “news media” as an
unqualified source of public disclosure has changed following the ACA
amendment.
In the Graham County case, Wilson, the respondent whistleblower, ar-
gued for a narrow reading of “administrative” reports, audits, and investiga-
tions.201 Wilson wanted her FCA claim to clear the pre-ACA public
disclosure bar.202 The trouble was, the allegations upon which Wilson based
her qui tam suit were already disclosed in a local Graham County, North
Carolina audit report released five years before Wilson filed her FCA
suit.203 At issue in the Graham County case, again, was whether “adminis-
trative reports” encompassed only Federal disclosures, or also extended to
state and local disclosures.
In arriving at its conclusion, the Supreme Court interpreted the purpose
of Section 3730(e)(4) as a means “to strike a balance between encouraging
199. Graham Cnty., 559 U.S. at 283.
200. See supra text accompanying note 165.
201. See Graham Cnty., 559 U.S. at 283–86.
202. See id. at 284–85.
203. Id. at 284.
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private persons to root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits . . . .”204 The
Court’s discussion of the “news media” provision of Section 3730(e)(4)
highlights the inconsistency Congress has left inherent in the post-ACA
public disclosure bar. Wilson argued that the purpose of Section 3730(e)(4)
is to draw a line between matters the federal government is unlikely to learn
about (state and local investigations) and matters readily available to the
Department of Justice because of their status as “federal inquiries.”205 Wil-
son argued that only the former ought to clear the public disclosure bar.206
The Court reasoned that while this proposition is not entirely implausible,
the argument is sheer conjecture:
Numerous federal investigations may be occurring at any given
time, and DOJ attorneys may not reliably learn about their find-
ings. DOJ attorneys may learn about quite a few state and local
inquiries, especially when the inquiries are conducted pursuant to
joint federal-state program[s] . . .207
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that Wilson approached the question
from the wrong direction. “The statutory touchstone, once again, is whether
the allegations of fraud have been ‘public[ly] disclosed,’ not whether they
have landed on the desk of a DOJ lawyer.”208 In that sense, some state court
proceedings are as publicly disclosed as news media reports. In many cases,
they are arguably more prominent, and thus easier, for an opportunistic qui
tam plaintiff to find.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court criticized Wilson for giving insuffi-
cient weight to Congress’s 1986 decision to bar qui tam actions based on
disclosures “from the news media.”209 From the naked, unqualified inclu-
sion of “news media” disclosures, the Court interpreted a “jurisdiction-
stripping category [that] forecloses the suggestion that the 1986 amend-
ments implemented a single-minded intent to increase the availability of qui
tam litigation.”210 Additionally, “since the ‘news media’ include a large
number of local newspapers and radio stations, this category likely de-
scribes a multitude of sources that would seldom come to the attention of
the Attorney General.”211
The point is this: Congress has crafted a public disclosure bar that does
not have a clear intent. Is the bar aimed broadly at foreclosing parasitic
actions in order to balance the power of the qui tam provision generally? Or
is the point to allow some parasitic actions but not others? It appears for
204. Id. at 295 (“How exactly § 3730(e)(4) came to strike this balance in the way it did is a
matter of considerable uncertainty.”).
205. Id. at 300.
206. Id.
207. Graham Cnty., 559 U.S. at 299.
208. Id. at 300 (internal citation omitted).
209. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id. (emphasis added).
211. Id.
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now that Congress has elected the latter approach. But with “[t]he past
serv[ing] as prologue,”212 this is undoubtedly a risky path to travel.
As a final note regarding the inconsistent classes of enumerated “pub-
lic disclosures” under the new Section 3730(e)(4), it is important to keep in
mind the momentum behind efforts to make government information more
transparent. In no time at all, certain classes of government reports, audits,
and investigations may be as widely available on the Internet as news media
reports. These sources of state information may now provide the basis for
FCA qui tam lawsuits. Yet they will be just as easily obtainable as “news
media” reports, which will continue to be barred as sources of FCA qui tam
suits. The Supreme Court in Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex
rel. Kirk flagged how this sort of sifting through easily (i.e., publicly) ob-
tained information is out of line with the idea that the public disclosure bar
ought to block opportunists.213
In Schindler Elevator, the Supreme Court held that a federal agency’s
written response to a FOIA request for records constitutes a “report” within
the meaning of the FCA’s public disclosure bar.214 This holding, however,
will arguably not apply to a “report” issued by a State agency pursuant to a
state FOIA request for suits filed after the ACA amendments. Nonetheless,
the Court’s reasoning in Schindler Elevator highlights how Congress has
created an inconsistent statute that lets some parasitic suits through, but not
others.
In Schindler Elevator, the Court observed that “anyone could identify
a few regulatory filing and certification requirements, submit FOIA re-
quests until he discovers a federal contractor who is out of compliance, and
potentially reap a windfall in a qui tam action under the FCA.”215 For that
reason, the court held that an FOIA answer should count as a public disclo-
sure and foreclose the possibility of a parasitic or opportunistic FCA ac-
tion.216 For the same reason, a suit based on a State FOIA answer should
also bar an FCA suit against a contractor who is doing dual work for the
state and federal governments. Both, as the Court in Schindler Elevator
concluded, are opportunistic and ought to be discouraged.217
212. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir.
1994).
213. See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1894 (2011).
214. Id. at 1889.
215. Id. at 1894.
216. See id.
217. See id.
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D. What a Backlash Might Look Like: Congress Has Already Spelled
Out What a Pared-Down Whistleblower Provision Can Look
Like
Congress knows how to write a pared-down whistleblower statute.
And a Congressional overreaction to the potential flood of parasitic FCA
qui tam suits that will clear the new public disclosure bar could take a simi-
lar form—a FCA with drastically fewer incentives for whistleblowers to
come forward, or perhaps none at all. For that reason, proponents of the
FCA in Congress should reconsider the amended public disclosure bar
before an over-correction becomes a real possibility.
Assistant United States Attorney D. Gerald Wilhelm has been prose-
cuting FCA litigation on behalf of the government for more than fourteen
years in the District of Minnesota. From his view on the front lines of the
issue, the ACA amendments to the public disclosure bar will have the prac-
tical effect of lowering the barriers to entry. This will increase the number
of FCA filings, because more attorneys are now willing to devote resources
to pursuing possible qui tam suits.218 Wilhelm says that this increase in
filings is a good thing—a position that is easily understood when you con-
sider his front-seat observation of the billions of dollars taxpayers have re-
covered since the FCA’s 1986 amendments. But he also recognizes the
well-founded concern over parasitic filings:
There is no experiment without risk. But we will see how this
works. If we get a flood of groundless lawsuits that are pursued
by people without a good claim, Congress will move on it and
we’ll see that they’ll shut that off. But for now at least, it’s an
experiment—how are we finding the ‘mean?’ There’s really no
other way. . . . In terms of an overreaction, I guess I haven’t seen
the flood yet and so I’m not concerned, but I’m the last person in
the world to say it couldn’t happen and [that] the overreaction
couldn’t happen. I’ve seen it before, so it could.219
Among the loudest voices currently criticizing the FCA is the U.S.
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (the Chamber Institute).220 They would
most assuredly be among the loudest voices seeking to curtail the FCA if
the new, lower public disclosure bar results in an onslaught of parasitic qui
tam lawsuits. In the Chamber Institute’s October 2011 report recom-
mending various amendments to the FCA, the organization makes four pro-
posals. First, it advocates capping monetary rewards for whistleblowers.221
Second, the Chamber Institute favors providing incentives for employees to
218. Interview with D. Gerald Wilhelm, Assistant United States Attorney, Dist. of Minn., in
Minneapolis, Minn. (May 8, 2012) (audio recording on file with the author).
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., HUTT & DOLINSKY, supra note 3, at 2–3 (harshly criticizing the qui tam provi-
sions of the FCA).
221. Id. at 8.
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report internally through corporate compliance programs before being al-
lowed to file private rights of action under the FCA.222 Third, the Chamber
Institute would foreclose qui tam actions in all instances where a defendant
has already made a disclosure.223 Finally, the Chamber Institute argues that
the FCA should not be amended to overturn the Supreme Court’s Schindler
Elevator decision.224
The merits of the Chamber Institute’s arguments could fill the pages of
an entirely different Comment. But, suffice it to say, the arguments the
Chamber Institute makes constitute the kind of reforms that could be occa-
sioned by a flood of parasitic FCA suits. What is more, Congress, in tandem
with the loud voices coming from organizations like the Chamber Institute,
has its own precedent for what a more rigid whistleblower provision could
look like.
Dodd-Frank’s new whistleblower provision225 represents a victory for
those who had called for whistleblower bounties in the securities fraud con-
text.226 But, as Professor Rapp points out, the structure of the statute is a
“missed opportunity” for those who hoped for something more akin to the
FCA, the “‘gold-standard’ of whistleblower protection and bounty re-
wards.”227 While Dodd-Frank provides a process for seeking monetary re-
wards, it does not allow whistleblowers to litigate cases independently from
federal action.228 That is one notable difference between the two
whistleblower provisions. Professor Rap points to a possible culprit for this
emasculated rendition of a whistleblower statute:
Perhaps because of the power of the Wall Street lobby, which
regularly puts the “Military-Industrial Complex” to shame,
whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank will remain spectators in most
stages of the enforcement actions triggered by their revelations.229
This absence of a private right of action frustrates the ability of private
FCA plaintiffs to carry on where perhaps DOJ is underfunded, over-
whelmed, politically tarnished, or simply mistaken about the merits of a
relator’s claims. That is not the only precedent Dodd-Frank provides for the
kind of provisions Congress is willing to make a part of new whistleblower
222. Id. at 15.
223. Id. at 17.
224. Id. at 19.
225. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u-6 (Lexis Supp. 2011) (amending § 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
226. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street
by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 76 (2012)
(internal citation omitted).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 76–77.
229. Id. at 77.
890 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:3
statutes, Dodd-Frank also limits relators’ recoveries to instances where the
Government is able to recover more than $1 million.230
IV. PRESCRIPTION: AMEND THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BAR
Congress should amend 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) with language that res-
cues the “golden mean” and bars FCA qui tam lawsuits that would clear the
way for parasitic profits in whistleblowers’ pockets. I argue that the sim-
plest way to do this may be to include State, local, and Federal criminal,
civil, or administrative hearings in which the government or its agent is a
party; and State, local, and Federal reports, hearings, audits, or investiga-
tions among the enumerated sources of public disclosures that will bar a
plaintiff from taking a suit forward.
Yes, this change will make the job of disinterested third-party relators
more difficult, but that result is in line with Section 3730 as a whole, which
I argue is an informer’s statute, rather than a repeater’s statute. Further, it is
still not impossible for disinterested relators to do valuable work under the
FCA. With diligence that does not cross the line into harassment and preda-
tory activity, a third-party can still uncover “knowledge that is independent
of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions,
and who has voluntarily provided the information to the government before
filing an action under this section.”231 In fact, a robust original source rule
could present all whistleblowers—in the “informer’s statute” sense of the
word—with the keys to the courthouse, public disclosures notwithstanding.
Thus, I propose discussing the viability of a bright line public disclosure
bar, inclusive of State, local, and Federal sources of public disclosures. To
counteract harsh effects on legitimate informers who bring forth valuable
information about frauds against the government, I would advocate a strong
original source rule. The iteration currently in force under Section 3730 as
amended post-ACA may even suffice.232
CONCLUSION
Documented frauds against the government—especially in the area of
health care—provide all the staggering evidence one needs to support the
continued use of the False Claims Act. More than two-thirds of the $30.3
billion in fraud recoveries since 1986 came after whistleblowers stepped
forward to signal wrongdoing. To lose this powerful tool to an overcorrec-
tion because of the re-birth of an era of parasitic qui tam litigation would
230. See id. at 85 (discussing the statute and pertinent SEC regulations).
231. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (LEXIS through July 2010 amendments).
232. For a comprehensive discussion of the caution with which the courts ought to construe
the new “original source” provision, see, for example, Alexion, supra note 150, at 408 (arguing
for an “original source” exception that will ensure that, in cases in which allegations of fraud are
already public, only relators with information essential to the government’s case will be able to
take advantage of the FCA’s provisions.).
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deal a significant blow to current efforts to vindicate taxpayer rights. And
the work is just beginning. Waste and abuse of federal health care funds
cost taxpayers billions of dollars every year. The Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) estimated that a staggering 7.8% of the $24.1
billion paid out in fiscal year 2009 were improper payments.233 While not
entirely fraud, the claims should not have been paid.234
Ultimately, Congress had the power to narrow the public disclosure
bar and thereby broaden the class of potential qui tam suits that may be
filed. But with the past as our prologue, Congress’s amendment opened the
door to parasitic actions that may present the kind of challenges that have
led to overreactions in the past (i.e., the 1943 amendments). The best way to
ensure the longevity of the FCA as a meaningful tool to use against fraud
and abuse is to strive for the “golden mean.” Congress can do that with a
tight balance between incentivizing relators to come forward and barring
opportunistic plaintiffs from drawing the ire of loud FCA detractors and a
public that is resentful of whistleblower windfalls. If anything, this Com-
ment is a cautionary tale that argues for moderation, a must-have for any-
thing as potent and productive as the False Claims Act.
233. Health Care Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Serious Issues That Must Be Addressed Through
Concentrated and Sustained Efforts: Hearing before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
Subcomm. on Health, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services).
234. Id.
